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    or more than half a century, since the end of World War II, the United States and its 
European allies—“the West”—have played a dominant role in shaping Africa’s outlook and 
fortunes (Blum 2013). The West consolidated this pioneering role by leveraging both bilateral 
and multilateral relations, and through the activities of its surrogate institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the World Bank (Kopiński and Sun 2014), and has enjoyed a virtual monopoly 
over its “husbandry” of Africa for decades (Williamson 2012).1  It is hardly surprising, then, 
that China’s forceful foray into Africa in recent times continues to attract attention (see, for 
example, Shen 2015; Yi-Chong 2014; Hays 2013; Bangui 2012; Brautigam 2010; Raine 2009; 
Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Rotberg 2008; Gill, Huang, and Morrison 2007).  
 While the epic question of what China wants to accomplish in Africa constitutes the 
nexus of world attention (Kopiński and Sun 2014; Bartholomew 2012; Alden and Large 2011; 
Brookes and Shin 2006), it is the notion that China is winning the battle for hearts and minds 
and is rapidly displacing the West as the dominant economic and political force in Africa 
(Nesbitt 2011, 1) that makes the West most anxious (Council of Foreign Relations 2006). As 
Francis Nesbitt (2011, 1) observed, given the West’s long-standing agenda for political and 
economic liberalization in Africa (Davies 2010; Alden and Hughes 2009; Taylor and Xiao 
2009), this development epitomizes the most dramatic shift in geopolitics since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  
 Several theories have been advanced to explain China’s outreach into Africa (see, 
for example, Fairbanks and Ncube 2012; Corkin 2011a; van Dijk 2011; Downs 2007; Gill and 
Reilly 2007, 46). The outreach may be an opportunistic “resource grab” designed to fuel 
China’s own economic growth. China may be flexing its muscle with the intention to either 
displace the West or signify her arrival on the global stage. China’s objectives may also entail 
sustainable engagement rooted in its rise as a world economic power eager to spread its 
influence and culture (Grimm 2014; Wang and Zou 2014; Zhao 2014; Kachiga 2013; 
Eisenman 2012; Bremmer 2010; Alden, Large, and De Oliveira 2008; Koning 2007; Alden 
2005).  
We believe China’s outreach displays elements of all three explanations. Clearly, 
Beijing desires a piece of the action in Africa and knows that it cannot accomplish this goal 
without first curtailing the West’s enduring stranglehold on the continent (Campbell 2008). In 
its effort to achieve this ambitious objective, China has predictably propagated an African 
policy to undercut the West, which endears it to Africans as an attractive “soft-touch” 
alternative (“buying love”) to the dreaded social engineering “conditionalities” (“dispensing 
tough-love”) (Kopiński and Sun 2014) of the West that have brought opprobrium from 
Africans and their leaders and supporters (Sachs 2012). Of course not to be outdone, the U.S. 
has assuredly countered with its own “soft” measures such as the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) (Makwerere and Chipaike 2012, 312).2 
                                                          
1 This has never been by design. The USSR and its Russian Successor, not to mention 
satellite states such as Cuba and Venezuela, have attempted to advance their particular 
brands of communism against American capitalism. 
2 The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 is a preferential trade 
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 Despite massive investment in Africa, which both buttresses the ubiquitous cry that 
the “Chinese are coming” (BBC 2012), and, perhaps, substantiates assertions concerning the 
firmness of Beijing’s commitment to the region (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012), there is little 
systematic evidence concerning the success of China’s contemporary African adventure.3 The 
effectiveness of the Chinese outreach remains an open question requiring careful attention to 
the attitudes of African citizens and not just to progressive elites exuberant about China’s 
generosity. This research addresses perhaps the most important question concerning the extent 
to which China’s influence is undermining American interests in the region: Is it true that 
China is beating the U.S. in the battle for the hearts and minds of Africans? If so, whose hearts 
and minds are being won, and what difference does that victory make? Specifically, does it 
portend China’s supplantation of the West as the dominant force in the continent? Our purpose 
in pursuing these questions is to shine empirical light on what has been a subject of immense 
commentary and speculation.  
 Pew’s 2013 Spring Global Attitudes Survey provides micro-level data for our study. 
The data set spans six Sub-Saharan African nations (Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, and Uganda) and contains items permitting appraisal of China’s success in Africa vis-
à-vis the U.S. Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana were among the top five African nations to 
receive Chinese investment through 2013, and Kenya and Uganda among the top 15.4 These 
five countries are among the top 15 which have received close to three-quarters of total 
Chinese investment on the continent (Shen 2015, 89). Our study offers strong evidence that 
these investments have indeed had a profound effect on Africans. However, we also find that, 
in order to further this influence, Africans’ lack of enthusiasm for Chinese culture—
especially, for China’s state capitalism—is a major impediment that will have to be overcome.  
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline the historical trajectory of China’s 
involvement in Africa and present a working hypothesis of the typical African’s acceptance 
of China vis-à-vis the U.S. This is followed by a description of the data and research. The 
results are presented in two major sections using both descriptive and inferential statistics. 
The final part of the paper discusses the implications of the results for African States, the 
United States, China, and the world moving forward. 
 
China’s Foray into Africa 
 China’s engagement with Africa dates back to 618 A.D. (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012, 
1). Fairbanks and Ncube partition that involvement into three broad periods. The early phase 
stretches from 618 A.D. and lasted to 1949 when the second wave of Chinese immigrants 
arrived in Africa after the formation of the People’s Republic. The second phase lasted from 
1960 to 1989, and witnessed both an ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the 
West, and the subsequent agitation for independence by colonized African states. The third 
phase in the 1990s saw structural reforms fuel China’s own economic boom and open new 
                                                          
arrangement that benefits selected products from eligible African countries by providing 
them duty free entry into the U.S. market. 
3 We must be clear that our purpose in this research is not to engage the discussion on the 
propriety of American, Chinese, or other countries’ involvements in Africa. As important as 
that topic is, it is beyond our modest goal here. 
 
4 The other two are Zambia and Ethiopia. Together, the top five countries make up almost 
40% of the total projects in the region. 
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vistas of opportunity (Wang and Elliot 2014,1013; Taylor 1998) that have boosted Chinese 
engagement with Africa to new levels (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). Propelled by a dynamic 
economy that has sustained a steady average annual real growth rate of about 10 percent for 
30 years, China is now the world’s second largest economy with a GDP nearing nine percent 
of the world’s total (Lin 2012). Complemented by her massive foreign reserves, China now 
has the wherewithal to be a serious global player (Yi-Chong 2014). Nowhere is this potential 
more obvious than in Africa. In 1980, Sino-African trade was a mere US$1 billion, but by 
2011 it had ballooned to US$155 billion (Yi-Chong 2014; Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). In 
2011, China became Africa’s largest trading partner with a total volume of US$199 billion 
and a trade deficit of US$28 billion in 2013 (Wang and Elliot 2014, 1014). 
As Sino-African trade expanded, so have other forms of engagements. China’s 
investment in Africa jumped from $490 million in 2003 to $9.33 billion in 2009 (Lin 2012, 
citing China Information Office of State Council 2010), while official aid increased from 
US$800 million in 2005 to US$1.4 billion in 2009 (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). By 2013, 
Chinese direct foreign investment was US$20 billion (Shen 2015). During the period 2000-
2011, China provided US$75 billion in aid to Africa, while the comparable figure for the U.S 
was US$90 billion. China has also been providing debt relief in substantial amounts (Wang 
2007). Beyond trade and finance, China provides aid in education, medical services and civic 
projects; builds schools and provides scholarships to African students interested in studying 
in China (Wang and Elliot 2014, 1014; King 2013). China has also provided support for 
peacekeeping missions in places such as Burundi, Congo (DRC), Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Western Sahara (Wang and Elliot 
2014, 1014; Deng and Wang 2012).  
While China’s initial foray into Africa was channeled through state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), both central and provincial (Gu 2009; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Alden 
and Davies 2006), Chinese citizens, private construction, manufacturing, and trading firms 
now litter the African landscape. It is estimated that there are between 1 and 2 million Chinese 
citizens residing in the region (Shen 2015; Wang and Elliot 2014, 1013; Grimm 2014; Zhao 
2014). The largest concentration of Chinese (more than 100,000 persons) resides in South 
Africa, but there are also sizable Chinese populations in Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Shen 2015).  
 As a burgeoning superpower, China has basic needs that Africa can meet. These 
needs are both political and economic (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012; Taylor 2006). China needs 
energy, raw materials, and new markets for finished goods, all of which Africa possesses in 
abundance (Moyo 2013; Eisenman 2012; Tang 2010; Zweig and Jianhai 2005). In turn, Africa 
has financial and infrastructural needs that China can fulfill. However, what would appear as 
a symbiotic exchange may only be a veiled exploitation of Africans who receive pittances in 
return for draining their natural endowments (Makwerere and Chipaike 2012). China has a 
policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its African partners, preferring a quid pro 
quo on typically apolitical terms. However, some see this as nothing more than a strategy to 
“undercut” the West (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). This policy has allowed China to engage 
African nations, even those branded by the West as rogue states. In turn, the West has accused 
China of undermining the global liberal order by offering itself as a “cheap” alternative to 
dubious African leaders (Corkin 2011b; Kurlantzick 2007; Tull 2006). With China showing 
little enthusiasm for changing her policy, the West appears to be softening its own 
conditionality regimes with programs such as AGOA (Kopiński and Sun 2014).  Meanwhile, 
China has been amassing goodwill, especially among the African ruling elite who now have 
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unprecedented access to credit and financing (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012).  
There also is evidence that ordinary Africans have begun to perceive China’s impact 
on their economies (Wang and Elliot 2014). In fact, the outcry that the U.S. is losing its grip 
on Africa is predicated on China’s heavy investment in infrastructure and development 
projects, which are offered to Africans at lower transaction costs (Kopiński and Sun 2014). In 
short, while the West has been “preaching” the seemingly illusive gospel of democracy, good 
governance, and disease eradication, China has been investing in local projects and buying its 
way into the hearts and minds of Africans (Kopiński and Sun 2014). The implication is that 
the typical African’s acceptance of China is instrumental (as opposed to ideological), linked 
to the benefits Chinese investments bring to local African economies. If this assumption is 
true, it sets the stage for expecting that China will “outdo” the U.S. in Africa based on 
African’s recognition of China’s central role in their nations’ economies. Accordingly, our 
two working hypotheses can be deduced from this assumption, as follows:  
 
H1: The African Acceptor of China will be one who sees China as playing both a robust 
and positive role on the country economy. That is, perception of her role in the economy 
will explain China’s acceptance by Africans. 
 
H2: Greater perception of China’s role in the country economy will explain higher levels 
of Chinese acceptance by Africans vis-à-vis the U.S. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 Our inquiry is based on data generated by the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey, conducted between March and April, 2013 on national probability samples of adults 
18 years or older in six Sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, and Uganda).5These six countries are by no means representative of all of Sub-
Saharan Africa, but they include some of the most significant countries of the region with 
respect to population size, economics, and politics. Pooling the data for these countries is 
appropriate since the same multi-stage cluster sampling and stratification techniques were 
employed throughout to generate the country samples. Moreover, Pew used face-to-face 
interviews to generate the data for these countries.  Given the nature of the data, our analyses 
and projections are subject to the typical limitations of both self-report and cross-sectional 
data. 
 Two kinds of analyses are performed. First, we calculate patterns of responses across 
survey items that permit comparisons of perceptions between the U.S. and China. These 
descriptive statistics (percentage indices) are then used to assess China’s success in winning 
hearts and minds vis-à-vis the U.S. by subtracting China’s scores from those of the U.S. on a 
number of dimensions. A positive value indicates a gap greater for the U.S., while a negative 
value indicates a gap greater for China. To address the second prong of the question 
concerning whose hearts and minds are being won over by China, we turn to regression 
analysis. Here, we estimate the effects of demographic and other factors associated with 
Africans’ acceptance of China. This latter approach allows us to profile the African Acceptor 
of China (AAC). 
 
Winning Hearts and Minds 
                                                          
5 See the top of Table 1 for distribution of the probability sample. 
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 Some of the survey items allow preference between U.S. and China. Other items 
permit only independent validation without necessarily forcing a comparison or choice 
between the two. We define an African Acceptor of China (AAC) as one who, when given a 
choice between the U.S. and China would consistently opt for China, and who evaluates China 
positively on an item which measures approval/disapproval or acceptance/rejection. We 
culled 10 items which measure these attributes as follows: “Have favorable opinion of 
country;” “Country is a threat to survey country;”6 “Best model economy to follow;” “China 
will replace the US as the world’s superpower; “Think about others in making decisions”; 
“Good that their ideas and customs are spreading here;” “Like their way of doing business;” 
“Like their music, movies & television;” “Who our country should have strong ties with;” and 
“Is more of a partner with our country.” We coded each question such that a positive response 
for China equals “1” and a negative response equals “0,” for a range between 0-10, where 0 
would represent the lowest score for acceptance of China, while 10 will represent the highest. 
Reliability analysis for the 10-count scale produced an acceptable Cronbach’s Alpha of .695. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variable of primary focus is “Perceived Chinese role in the 
economy.” Two questions are used to measure it. Question 81 asked: “How much influence 
do you think China is having on economic conditions in (the survey country)”? We coded the 
responses “A great deal” and “A fair amount” as “1,” and “Not too much” and “No influence 
at all” as “0.” The follow up question (81b) asked: “If a great deal or fair amount in question 
81—Right now, is China having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (the 
survey country)”? Again, positive responses were coded as “1” and negative responses as “0.” 
Positive answers to 81 represent perceived robustness of China’s role in the economy, (CER), 
while 81b represents both robust and positive role (CERP). Besides demographic factors, three 
other variables were introduced as independent variables. One measures personal while the 
second measures national economic outlook. The third is an instrumental variable that acts as 
a surrogate for respondents’ orientation toward liberalism.  
 National economic well-being is a tertiary scale comprising the following questions: 
1. “Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic 
situation?” (four options collapsed into good/bad);  2. “Over the next 12 months do you expect 
the economic situation in our country to improve?”; and 3. “When children today in our 
country grow up, do you think they will be better off or worse off financially than their 
parents?” Personal economic well-being is measured on a binary scale combining the 
following questions: 1. “Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would 
you describe it?” (combination of four good/bad); and 2. “Over the next 12 months do you 
expect your personal economic situation to improve?” The instrumental question, 71, asked: 
“How important is it to you that people have access to the Internet without government 
censorship?” “Very important” and “Somewhat important” were coded as “1,” and “Not too 
important” and “Not important at all” were coded as “0.” Poverty status needs some 
explanation. Question 182a asked: “Have there been times during the last year when you did 
not have enough money to buy food for your family?” Instead of income, we used this question 
to measure affordability. Although the income variable was included in the survey, we had 
concern regarding its capacity to express consumption levels across countries. First, it was 
                                                          
6 This item was recorded for the 10-count scale to make it amenable to an additive scale 
measuring a positive outcome. Thus, not a threat=1, and threat=0. 
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denominated in each country’s local currency. While this problem could be ameliorated by 
converting to some common standard, such as American Dollars, that would lead to additional 
concern that real consumption levels might be lost in such a conversion.   
 The regressions are performed at two levels. The first are three macro-specifications 
introducing country fixed-effects. The models for men and women allow us to compare the 
effects of the independent variables across gender. There are strong theoretical reasons to 
anticipate differential rates of gender acceptance of China on the one hand, and gender 
acceptance of China based on perceived contributions to the economy on the other hand. The 
first is ideological, while the second is pragmatic. Extant literature suggests that men are more 
prone to accepting and tolerating outsiders (Golebiowska 1999). Thus, African women may 
not warm up to China as readily as African men. On the other hand, structural inequalities 
embedded in the social and economic systems of African countries (particularly as it relates 
to education and employment) continue to channel limited resources and opportunities toward 
men, impoverishing and relegating women to second-class citizenship (Rebouché 2006). Any 
infusion of new life and expansion of the economy will make the system more robust and 
benefit women disproportionately (Olowu 2006). Accordingly, while African women may not 
welcome China as readily as African men, rational group self-interest driven by the fact that  
women may benefit far more from all aspects of China’s “generosity” than men may increase 
the marginal effects on the likelihood of China’s acceptance for women vis-à-vis  perceived 
China’s effect on the economy. The Fixed-Effects Feature (CTR) holds respondents from 
particular countries together throughout the iterations, controlling for country-specific factors. 
The second set of regressions is performed at the country level. The equations we estimated 
are of the form: 
 
ACC = a + b1CER + b2CERP + b3Xn + b4CTR + e,               (1) 
 
(Where, ACC is the 10-count scale of African acceptance of China with a mean of 5.03, 
standard deviation of 2.48, and Cronbach’s alpha of .695; CER is the respondent’s perceived 
robustness of China’s role in the economy; CERP is both the respondent’s perceived 
robustness and value of China’s role in the economy; X is the vector of other explanatory 
variables including demographics; and CTR is the set of country dummies introducing the 
fixed-effects feature). Since the dependent variable is continuous we use OLS regression to 
estimate the models. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 The profile of the 5,043 respondents is displayed in Table 1. Men and women are 
nearly evenly distributed in the sample. The profile captures what can be expected of a 
stratified random sample in Sub-Saharan Africa: Older adults of approximately middle age 
(according to the World Bank 2012, life expectancy at birth in the region is 56 years). The 
average age is 35, with the men being slightly older (36.1 years) than the women (34.7 years). 
Men are more likely to be employed, while women are both poorer and more likely to be 
married. Women are less likely to have received formal education, though the gender gap 
disappears at the primary/grade-school level. The second type of gap occurs at higher levels 
of educational attainment, where men are clearly advantaged. Thirty percent of respondents 
are Muslim and 42 percent are urban residents. The mean on country well-being is 1.54 out 
of 3 (about 51 percent), while that of personal economic well-being is 1.16 out of 2 (about 58 
percent).  The men are more enthusiastic about internet liberalization. About 68 percent of the 
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respondents report that China has a robust role in their economies. China’s rating on the 10-
count scale is moderate, mean of 5.03 (about 50.3%), with some gender gap. 
 
U.S. vs. China in Africa 
 The first set of data comparing Africans’ assessments of the U.S. and China is 
presented in Table 2. The last category labeled “USA minus China” reports the percentage 
differences indices for the entire sample (“All”), “Men,” and “Women.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1   Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics 
Respondents All 
Respondents 
Me
n 
Wome
n 
All 5043 253
7 
2506 
Ghana 799 408 391 
Kenya 798 458 340 
Nigeria 1031 517 514 
Senegal 800 358 442 
South Africa 815 408 407 
Uganda 800 388 412 
Variable Weighted Means 
Age 35.4 36.1     34.7 
Unemployed 59.7% 53.2% 66.2% 
Married/cohabitating 50.3% 56.7% 57.3% 
Education    
    None 11.8% 8.9% 14.6% 
    Primary 23.5% 20.3% 26.8% 
    Secondary 47.1% 49.7% 44.5% 
    University 17.6% 21.1% 14.1% 
Religion (Muslim) 30.1% 28.4% 31.8% 
Poverty status 58.2% 56.4% 59.9% 
Urban 41.9% 40.8% 43.0% 
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Acceptance of China (10-
count) 
5.03a  5.34 4.72 
Chinese economic role 
robust 
68.3% 73.1% 63.9% 
Economic role 
robust/positive 
50.0% 54.4% 45.7% 
Internet liberalism 65.4% 70.1% 60.7% 
Econ well-being self (2-
count) 
1.16 1.19 1.14 
Country Economy  (3-count) 1.54 1.57 1.51 
asd=2.48.  
  
As noted earlier, a positive value indicates a disparity greater for the U.S., while a negative 
indicates a disparity greater for China. This final category addresses both the robustness of 
the differences between USA and China and the magnitude of the gender gap. 
Africans have favorable opinions of both countries, although they are clearly more 
favorably disposed to the U.S. (margin = 8.7%). African women are more favorably disposed 
to the U.S., but both men and women have more favorable opinions of the U.S. Moreover, 
greater proportions of Africans view China’s power and influence as a threat. While only 
about half of the respondents see U.S. free market capitalism as the best model for their 
countries, Africans overwhelmingly reject Chinese state capitalism. In fact, this particular 
item produces one of the widest margins between the U.S. and China (margin = 24.0%). 
Africans score the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power (margin = 37.6%), though they 
are also clear that China will eventually replace the U.S. as the world’s superpower (margin 
= -5.3%). On the question of whether the U.S and China consider the interests of their 
countries in making international policy decisions, Africans score the U.S. 67.1 percent, China 
63.8 percent, with a 3.3 percent differential. Another area of marked difference pertains to 
exporting of ideas and culture, ways of doing business, and cultural trappings such as music, 
movies, and television. Respondents overwhelmingly favor the U.S., and the margins are quite 
robust (7.7%, 12.4%, and 22.6% respectively). Africans admire both countries for their 
technological advances, but tend to prefer what the U.S. brings to the table (margin = 8.5%).  
 Most Africans believe that the U.S. has more influence on their countries generally 
(margin = 6.9%) and a little less on their countries’ economies specifically (margin = 3.2%). 
When asked whether that influence is good or positive Africans tend to score both the U.S. 
and China at similar levels. These comparisons produce the least disparity between the two 
countries. If forced to choose, Africans clearly prefer closer ties with the U.S. (35.0% vs. 
24.2%; margin = 10.8%), although a fair proportion (29.1%) responded that they would prefer 
closer ties with both countries.  This item produces a robust gender gap (7.6% vs. 14.1%): 
African women are more sanguine about the U.S. than men.  Finally, on the partnership 
question, Africans score both countries highly, although the U.S. has a slight edge (margin = 
3.7%). 
Do these data corroborate the notion that China is winning the battle for hearts and 
minds in Africa? Frankly, based on the strength of our findings, our initial inclination is to 
dismiss the insinuation with a resounding no. Still, we can imagine how one with a different 
point of reference could form a contrary opinion. If one’s idea of China becoming the 
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dominant force in Africa is rooted in the prism of which country Africans consider as the 
world’s superpower, then Africans’ firm position that China will replace the U.S. would seem 
to have placed that assertion beyond debate. However, to address the question adequately, one 
must interrogate the core issue of what the respective influences of the two countries means 
beyond an immediate preoccupation with aid, infrastructural development, and the dance of 
symbolic politics.  
 Unless one is prepared to accept the narrative that American and Chinese forays into 
Africa are artifacts of pure benevolence, one must turn to the investment and return dynamic 
for some explication of motives. If China’s ultimate goal in Africa is rooted in its rise as a 
world economic power eager to spread its influence and culture globally, it faces a huge 
obstacle in two major areas. First, compared to U.S. free market capitalism, Africans roundly 
reject China’s state capitalism.  
 
 
Table 2   African’s Ratings of USA and China 
 Mean Score %  % Difference 
 USA  China  USA minus China 
Survey 
Item 
All Me
n 
Wome
n 
 All Me
n 
Wome
n 
 All Me
n 
Wome
n 
Favorable 77.
0 
78.6 75.3  68.
3 
72.0 64.5  8.7 6.6 10.8 
Threat  44.
4 
46.5 42.3  50.
2 
52.7 47.7  -5.5 -6.2 -5.4 
Best model 52.
2 
54.9 49.4  28.
2 
29.0 27.3  24.
0 
25.9 22.1 
Leading econ 57.
3 
59.1 55.5  19.
7 
22.1 17.2  37.
6 
37.0 38.3 
Replace US 34.
4 
37.0 31.8  39.
7 
44.4  35.0  -5.3 -7.4 -3.2 
Consider 
Others 
67.
1 
69.7 64.4  63.
8 
67.5 60.0  3.3 2.2 4.4 
Ideas 54.
8 
57.0 52.6  47.
1 
49.7 44.5  7.7 7.3 8.1 
B. model 72.
9 
75.4 70.4  60.
5 
63.8 57.1  12.
4 
11.6 13.3 
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Like music 59.
7 
62.7 56.7  37.
1 
41.0 33.0  22.
6 
21.7 23.7 
Admire tec 82.
3 
85.4 79.2  73.
8 
77.1 70.4  8.5 8.3 8.8 
Good econ 61.
5 
64.2 58.6  - - -  - - - 
Influence 72.
4 
75.0 69.7  65.
5 
69.2 61.7  6.9 5.8 8.0 
Inf. good  68.
4 
67.5 69.5  68.
1 
67.5 68.8  0.3 0.0 0.7 
Inf. econ 71.
5 
74.4 68.5  68.
3 
73.3 63.3  3.2 1.1 5.2 
Positive 73.
4 
72.6 74.3  73.
2 
74.1 72.1  0.2 0.5 2.2 
Country 
ties 
35.
0 
35.2 34.9  24.
2 
27.6 20.8  10.
8 
7.6 14.1 
Partner  71.
4 
74.2 68.6  67.
7 
70.7 64.7  3.7 3.5 3.9 
Respect 71.
3 
75.0 67.6  52.
8 
57.6 48.0  18.
5 
17.4 19.6 
Democrac
y 
73.
6 
77.0 70.3  - - -  - - - 
Figures in parentheses are corresponding questionnaire numbers. N for all = 5,043; N for 
men = 2,537; N for women = 2,506.  
Second, Africans prefer American ideas and customs, business practices, and cultural 
trappings, such as popular music, movies, and television, to Chinese alternatives.  
It is clear, then, that the case for China’s supposed superiority in winning hearts and minds 
has been overstated. This conclusion is noteworthy given the finding that Africans evaluate 
the two countries as virtual equals on their respective roles in their countries and economies. 
 
U.S. vs. China across African Countries 
The country data are displayed in Table 3. Kenyans have favorable opinions of both 
countries; admire both nations for their technological advances; see both countries as potential 
partners in development; and would like to see their country cultivate and maintain close 
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relationships with both nations. The average Kenyan believes that China will usurp the U.S. 
as the world’s superpower. Kenyans reject China’s state capitalism by a robust margin 
(21.2%); see China’s power and influence as a greater threat to their country (margin = -7.9%); 
and prefer American ideas and culture (margin = 5.3%), ways of doing business (margin = 
13.0%), and cultural trappings such as music, movies, and television (margin = 20.0%). 
 Ghanaians have a more favorable opinion of the U.S. (margin = 16.0%), believe the 
U.S. poses less of a threat than China (margin = -28.0%), and prefer the American economic 
model (margin = 28.0%). Similarly, Ghanaians prefer American ideas (margin = 5.7%), 
American ways of doing business (margin = 22.4%), and American culture (margin = 14.0%). 
Ghanaians believe the U.S. is a better partner than China (margin = 5.4%) and would prefer 
to see their country develop stronger ties with the U.S. (margin = 13.3%).  
 Nigerian respondents indicate the most favorable attitudes toward China. Indeed, if 
one focuses on Nigerian responses exclusively, the notion that China is “taking over” Africa 
could easily be sustained. Nigerians score China higher than the U.S. with respect to 
favorability (77.2% vs. 71.9%) and view the U.S. as a greater threat than China (37.7% vs. 
29.8%). Although Nigerians see the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power, they believe 
that China will replace the U.S. as the world’s superpower by a hefty -39.5 percentage point 
margin. Nigerians believe China weighs their country’s concerns in its foreign policy 
decisions more than the U.S. does (61.9% vs. 68.3%).  While Nigerians reject China’s state 
capitalism by the widest margin of any other country (54.2% vs. 18.0%), unlike other 
Africans, they prefer Chinese ideas and culture (61.2%), and Chinese ways of doing business 
(76.8%). Nigerians see the U.S. as having a slightly greater influence on their country and 
about the same level of influence as China on their economy, but Nigerians believe that 
Chinese influence is more positive. Finally, Nigerians believe their country should cultivate 
ties with China (18.4% vs. 34.2%), although 34.1 percent of the respondents prefer close ties 
with both countries. Not surprisingly, Nigerians rate China a better partner than the U.S. 
(63.2% vs. 71.9%). 
 The Senegalese have highly favorable opinions of both countries (81.0% and 76.9%). 
The Senegalese see the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power (71.8% vs. 11.3%), but 
they also indicate a mild belief that China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s superpower 
(35.3% vs. 38.5%). Senegalese are not sold on China’s state capitalism (18.7 percentage point 
differential). Moreover, the Senegalese score the U.S. higher with respect to ideas, culture, 
and cultural trappings by 8.5, 10.5, and 28.2 percent differentials respectively. Although the 
Senegalese give high marks to both countries on their contributions to their country and 
economy, they prefer closer ties with the U.S. (40.1% vs. 16.6%); although 33.9 percent 
responded that they would like closer connections with both countries. Finally, the Senegalese 
rate the U.S. as a better partner (83.9% vs. 77.8%). 
 Though South Africans vastly prefer the U.S. to China on favorability rating (72.5% 
vs. 47.9%) and judge the U.S. to be the world’s leading economic power, they also believe 
China will eventually overtake the U.S. as the world’s superpower. South Africans reject 
China’s state capitalism, and are not enthusiastic about Chinese ideas and culture (57.5% vs. 
37.2%). They dislike Chinese business practices (67.7% vs. 42.8%) and cultural trappings 
(71.7% vs. 21.3%). South Africans believe both countries have a significant amount of 
influence on their country (78.0% and 71.7%) and economy (72.8% and 70.7%). South 
Africans prefer closer ties with the U.S. (30.7% vs. 19.6%), though 29.8 percent responded 
that they would prefer closer ties with both countries. Finally, South Africans rate the U.S. as 
a better partner (58.8% vs. 50.8%). 
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 Ugandans have more favorable opinions of the U.S. (72.8% vs. 58.6%), but, 
seemingly paradoxically, they judge the U.S. to be a greater threat to their country, though the 
margin is small (51.6% vs. 48.4%). Ugandans recognize the U.S. as the leading world’s 
economic power and are the only respondents who reject the notion that China will eventually 
eclipse the U.S. as the world’s superpower (42.8% vs. 25.0%). Ugandans give China higher 
marks for its technological advances (61.9% vs. 78.3%), but reject China’s state capitalism 
(49.3% vs. 32.8%), ideas and culture (44.0% vs. 31.1%), business practices (64.5% vs. 
52.9%), and cultural trappings (46.6% vs. 28.5%). Ugandans say the U.S. has a greater 
influence on their country (69.1% vs. 54.3%) and economy (69.5% vs. 55.1%) and believe 
that this influence is positive. The question on which country to cultivate closer ties with 
produced the highest rating for the U.S. (51.8%) and the lowest rating for China (14.9%). A 
relatively small percentage of Ugandans (19.4) prefer closer ties with both countries. Finally, 
Ugandans prefer the U.S. to China as a partner (70.4% vs. 57.9%). 
 
The African Heart and Mind Being Won by China 
 The first set of regressions estimating the effects of various factors on Africans’ 
acceptance of China are arrayed in Table 4. One specification (All) is for the full sample, 
while the other two are sub-sample specifications for men and women. Overall, the results 
provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between China’s perceived role in the 
country economy and respondents’ acceptance of China. Respondents who say China has a 
robust role in their economy are more likely to report acceptance of China (β = .13, p<.001). 
Moreover, those who say China’s role is both robust and positive give China greater 
acceptance (β = .39, p<.001). Perusal of the results reveals that no other single variable 
approaches the magnitude of the marginal effect accorded to this factor. The equations for 
men (β = .12, p<.001) and women (β = .38, p<.001) suggest a substantial gender gap on the 
effect of this factor. Overall, however, our working hypothesis on the potential effects of 
gender receives strong support. First, the gender variable shows that African women are not 
as enthusiastic about China as African men (β = -.05, p<.001). However, perceived China’s 
contributions to the economy influences acceptance by men and women differentially, with 
its marginal effect clearly greater for women. This instrumental result is consistent across all 
models. 
Several other variables produce notable results as well. Older adults are not as 
accommodating of China as their younger counterparts. Educated Africans accept China 
more readily, while the unemployed, particularly unemployed women, are less likely to 
accept China. This result on unemployed women buttresses the finding above that women 
who stand to benefit from China’s largess are more likely to welcome China. Those who are 
more liberal and who score their countries’ economies as doing well are also more likely to 
accept China, again, totally in line with the instrumental expectation.  
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Table 3   Ratings of USA and China across Countries 
 Kenya Ghana Nigeria Senegal South Africa Uganda 
 USA China USA China USA China USA China USA China USA China 
Favorable 80.6 78.4 84.6 68.6 71.9 77.2 81.0 76.9 72.5 47.9 72.8 58.6 
Threat  62.4 70.3 31.2 59.2 37.7 29.8 33.3 36.6 52.5 62.7 51.6 48.4 
Best model 57.9 36.7 55.3 27.3 54.2 18.0 50.5 31.8 45.3 25.4 49.3 32.8 
Leading econ 65.4 19.9 52.6 19.5 52.5 26.4 71.8 11.3 46.0 25.8 57.4 13.1 
Replace US 37.5 48.6 36.0 40.4 28.8 68.3 35.3 38.5 28.1 46.3 42.8 25.0 
Consider others 79.2 77.2 60.7 57.8 61.9 68.5 67.4 61.6 72.8 66.4 62.1 49.8 
Ideas 60.9 55.6 37.7 32.0 57.8 61.2 70.1 61.6 57.5 37.2 44.0 31.1 
B. model 81.0 68.0 75.7 53.3 73.3 76.8 75.3 64.8 67.7 42.8 64.5 52.9 
Like music 58.1 38.1 57.4 43.4 63.1 54.5 60.0 31.8 71.7 21.3 46.6 28.5 
Admire tec 85.3 74.9 83.4 77.5 86.3 86.7 83.6 76.8 75.8 61.5 61.9 78.3 
Good econ 77.7 - 65.0 - 54.7 - 50.6 - 59.6 - 63.1 - 
Influence 84.8 78.9 68.0 62.3 69.7 66.4 65.4 58.9 78.0 71.7 69.1 54.3 
Inf. good  68.5 74.6 58.6 57.6 68.4 80.6 76.9 71.1 64.6 52.2 74.5 68.9 
Inf. econ 83.0 83.3 70.1 65.0 68.2 69.6 66.4 65.9 72.8 70.7 69.5 55.1 
Positive 79.8 80.5 61.4 60.9 71.6 86.2 84.6 78.7 66.4 57.8 77.0 69.2 
Country ties 36.8 32.8 
(27.2) 
37.3 24.0 
(28.9
) 
18.4 34.2 
(34.1) 
40.1 16.6 
(33.9
) 
30.7 19.6 
(29.8) 
51.8 14.9 
(19.4) 
Partner  78.9 76.9 75.7 70.3 63.2 71.9 83.9 77.8 58.8 50.8 70.3 47.1 
Respect 73.4 32.1 71.2 50.4 71.7 61.9 71.6 58.5 69.7 44.3 70.3 47.1 
Democracy 81.6 - 72.1 - 74.7 - 76.6 - 64.2 - 72.6 - 
 N=798 N=799 N=1031 N=800 N=815 N=800 
Entries are cumulative percentages. a Figures under USA represent responses of China will never replace the U.S. as 
the world’s superpower, while those under China represent responses of China will eventually or has already 
replaced the U.S. as the world’s superpower. bFigures in parentheses are percentages that volunteer that they would 
prefer to have close ties with both U.S. and China.  
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Finally, the country dummies confirm what was revealed by the descriptive data. Except for 
Senegal, which does not indicate a significant difference with Nigeria, the results suggest that, 
compared to any other country, being a Nigerian increases the likelihood of China’s 
acceptance. The results for South Africa and Uganda are particularly robust. Overall, the 
profile of an African acceptor of China (the African heart and mind being won) tends to be an 
educated, employed, relatively liberal younger man or woman, who is optimistic about his or 
her country’s economic outlook and believes China has contributed to that success.  
 The country results are displayed in Table 5. These results mostly replicate the 
outcome noted in Table 4 with respect to the effects of China’s role in the economy. China’s 
role is not only positive and significant for each country, but the magnitude of its effect is 
substantially greater than anything recorded elsewhere for any other variable for the countries. 
We have already noted that Nigerians tend to accept China more than any other Africans. The 
marginal effect of this instrumental variable is also greatest for Nigeria (β = .49, p<.001). 
Thus, the instrumentality hypothesis is also confirmed across all six countries. China scores 
highly across all the countries with respect to the education-level variable. Again, the effect 
of education is greatest for Nigeria (β = .17, p<.001). A final factor in Nigeria is liberalization 
(β = .13, p<.001).  
 Reviewing the results as a whole, an important dynamic appears to be what 
distinguishes Nigerian’s greater acceptance of China. The effects of the factors that support 
Africans’ acceptance of China are multiplied in Nigeria. At the same time, many of the factors 
that correlate with relative non-acceptance of China, such as gender, age, and poverty level 
are not operative. The negative effect of gender appears particularly salient in Ghana and 
Uganda, while that of poverty status appears in Uganda. Ghanaian women, older adults, the 
poor, and urban dwellers are less likely to accept China. Kenyan women, the poor, Muslims, 
and urbanites are also less likely to accept China. Only urban Nigerians are relatively less 
likely to accept China. In Senegal, older adults and the unemployed are less inclined to 
embrace China. In South Africa, older adults are less likely to accept China. Finally, Ugandan 
women, older adults, and the unemployed are less accepting of China. Obviously, these 
differences tap into ecological factors that, as designed, our comparative analysis cannot 
unravel.   
 
The Policy Battle for Hearts and Minds and the Difference it 
Makes
  
 Our findings confirm that China is amassing goodwill in Africa. It is doing so with 
its investments in infrastructure and other commitments that impact local economies (Foster 
et al. 2007). Ordinary Africans are aware of, and welcome, both the extent and importance of 
China’s role in their local economies. While the levels of inroads vary by country, it is clear 
that China has made its most impressive gains in Nigeria. China’s triumphs in Nigeria are 
orchestrated by a simple dynamic, where the effects that contribute to Chinese acceptance are 
magnified, and the effects that detract from Chinese acceptance are minimized.  
 Overall, our work highlights the importance of what many Africans now call 
“stomach” infrastructure—that is, facilities that cater to the immediate needs of the 
population. Those who argue that the West is losing ground to China claim that abstract 
emphases on democracy, good governance, and healthcare neglects this fundamental need for 
stomach infrastructure. In fact, some argue that it is this vacuum that China recognized and 
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has exploited quite effectively (Nesbitt 2011).  
 
 
Table 4 OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining China’s Acceptance by Africans 
 All  Men  Women 
Survey Item Beta t  Beta t  Beta T 
China’s econ role robust .13*** 8.39  .12*** 5.69  .14*** 6.20 
China’s econ role robust, 
positive 
.39*** 24.95  .12*** 18.03  .38*** 17.07 
Gender (female=1) -.05*** 4.56  - -  - - 
Age -.05*** 3.83  -.05* 2.53  -.05** 2.83 
Education .10*** 7.60  .12*** 6.29  .08*** 4.07 
Marital status (married) -.00 0.31  -.02 1.03  .01 0.47 
Poverty status (poor)  -.01 0.69  -.01 0.30  -.01 0.47 
Unemployed -.03* 2.40  -.03 1.56  -.04* 2.25 
Religion (Muslim=1) -.01 0.29  .02 0.90  -.03 1.37 
Urban -.01 1.04  -.00 0.40  -.02 1.37 
Internet Freedom (liberal) .06*** 4.99  .05** 3.05  .07*** 4.09 
Personal econ situation 
good 
.03+ 1.89  .03 1.38  .02 1.09 
Country econ situation 
good 
.06*** 4.51  .08*** 3.97  .05** 2.57 
Country Dummies 
(Nigeria) 
   
     Ghana -.09*** 6.64  -.08*** 4.01  -.12*** 5.59 
     Kenya -.07*** 4.57  -.08*** 3.48  -.06** 2.82 
     Senegal .00 0.24  -.02 0.88  .03 1.15 
     South Africa -.20*** 13.52  -.23*** 10.42  -.19*** 8.74 
     Uganda -.16*** 10.67  -.12*** 5.51  -.20*** 9.44 
Intercept 3.42*** 16.95  3.24*** 11.84  3.47*** 12.01 
R-square (x100) 38.8  37.5  38.8 
Adj. R-square (x100) 38.5  37.1  38.4 
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F-ratio 174.87***  87.81***  91.87*** 
N 4991  2507  2784 
Each are standardized regression coefficients with t-values in parenthesis. 
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***<.001; (two-tailed test). 
Table 5   OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining China’s Acceptance Across Countries 
Variable Ghana Kenya Nigeria Senegal South 
Africa 
Uganda 
China’s econ 
 role robust 
.03 
(0.85) 
.00 
(0.06) 
.07+ 
(1.78) 
.28*** 
(6.49) 
.19*** 
(5.88) 
.19*** 
(4.37) 
China’s econ role 
robust, positive 
 
.40*** 
(10.23) 
.32*** 
(7.82) 
.49*** 
(11.83) 
.34*** 
(8.06) 
.43*** 
(13.11) 
.31*** 
(7.32) 
Gender -.13*** 
(3.88) 
-.07* 
(2.11) 
-.03 
(1.18) 
-.00 
(0.16) 
.00 
(0.10) 
-.16*** 
(5.06) 
Age -.08 
(2.12) 
-.04 
(1.24) 
-.01 
(1.18) 
-.05+ 
(0.16) 
-.07* 
(0.10) 
-.06+ 
(5.06) 
Education .06+ 
(1.72) 
.09* 
(2.45) 
.17*** 
(5.85) 
-.09** 
(2.92) 
.03 
(0.92) 
-.01 
(0.19) 
Marital status 
(married) 
.03 
(0.92) 
-.01 
(0.19) 
-.04 
(1.35) 
.00 
(0.07) 
.04 
(1.22) 
-.02 
(0.59) 
Poverty status 
(poor)  
-.09** 
(2.61) 
-.11*** 
(3.58) 
.02 
(.77) 
-.04 
(1.26) 
.09 
(3.34) 
.00 
(0.04) 
Employment status 
(unemployed)  
.03 
(0.95) 
-.01 
(0.26) 
-.03 
(1.07) 
-.06* 
(2.16) 
-.01 
(0.35) 
-.06+ 
(1.83) 
 
Religion 
(Muslim=1) 
 
.09* 
(2.45) 
 
-.12*** 
(3.53) 
 
.01 
(0.17) 
 
.00 
(0.15) 
 
-.01 
(0.39) 
 
.02 
(0.60) 
Urban -.06+ 
(1.91) 
-.10** 
(3.13) 
-.09*** 
(3.73) 
-.07* 
(2.53) 
.03 
(1.01) 
.04 
(1.32) 
Internet freedom .01 
(0.18) 
.01 
(0.41) 
.13*** 
(4.87) 
.05 
(1.62) 
.08** 
(2.66) 
.08** 
(2.62) 
Personal economic 
situation good 
.05 
(1.30) 
.05 
(1.34) 
-.01 
(0.23) 
.01 
(0.14) 
-.03 
(0.65) 
.07+ 
(1.92) 
 
Country’s 
economic situation 
good 
 
.06 
(1.48) 
 
.16*** 
(4.06) 
 
.01 
(0.24) 
 
.01 
(0.28) 
 
.14*** 
(3.38) 
 
.01 
(0.31) 
Intercept 3.87*** 4.24*** 2.81*** 3.32*** 0.95 2.92*** 
R-square (x100) 24.9 24.9 42.9 41.9 42.2 33.0 
Adj. R-square 
(x100) 
23.6 23.6 42.2 41.0 41.2 31.9 
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F-ratio 
 
19.55*** 
 
19.96*** 
 
58.31*** 
 
43.37*** 
 
44.22*** 
 
29.53*** 
N 780 797 1023 795 803 793 
Entries are standardized regression coefficients with t-values in parentheses. 
+ p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; (two-tailed test). 
 
Stephen Hayes, President and CEO of the Corporate Council on Africa expresses this 
sentiment: “African nations are grateful for the roads they (Chinese) have built when few 
others would do so, the same roads that World Bank planning teams once would talk about 
for years but never develop, and the African leaders are no doubt grateful for the new 
construction rising throughout the Continent” (2013).   
 The second question pertains to the significance of China’s influence in Africa. If 
China is winning African hearts and minds, does this mean that the U.S. might be usurped as 
the dominant force on the continent? Africans see the U.S. as the world’s leading economic 
power, but most also believe that China will displace the U.S. as the world’s superpower. If 
this is what Western critics bemoan in their contention of a Chinese takeover in Africa, then 
the data corroborate that contention. But we believe there is more to this story. The 
international scene is beset by the persistent zeal to spread influence and culture (Yangwen, 
Liu, and Szonyi 2010). For the last 50 years, the U.S. and its European allies have been trying 
to “transplant” Western values to Africa (Carothers 2006). To the extent Chinese values differ 
from Western values, China’s success in Africa should be interpreted as a supplanting of the 
latter by the former. So the question arises, are China’s values usurping Western values in 
Africa? 
 On many fronts, when given a choice between the U.S. and China, the average 
African prefers the U.S. Even among Nigerians, China’s greatest enthusiasts, China’s state 
capitalism is roundly rejected. Furthermore, Africans are not fervent about Chinese culture 
and its popular trappings. These impediments must be addressed if China is truly going to 
overtake the West. Of course, this is not to suggest necessarily that Africans embrace Western 
values completely. If that were the case, liberal democracy would be manifest across Africa 
(Cheru 2012). Nonetheless, that Africans clearly prefer the West’s liberal democratic and free-
market economy traditions is an indication of the extent Western values have permeated the 
region.  
 
Policy Implications for Africa 
 Africans are in dire need of development assistance and appear ready to accept it 
from anyone willing to offer it. At the same time, these data indicate that Africans reject 
“recolonization” of their continent.  Overall, though, our results suggest that Africans may be 
viewing their relationship with the U.S. and China through a completely different prism, one 
largely devoid of the cold war ideological meme some remain frozen in on the global stage. 
What is clear is that China appears to have met Africans on their own terms by advancing a 
no-strings-attached partnership where resources are provided largely without explicit 
conditions and certainly without the stringent conditions imposed by the West (Brautigam, 
2010). Ideology is irrelevant and that is the difference between China’s spectacular inroads of 
the present and her largely spectator role of the past. Clearly, this ability to separate ideological 
concerns from the quest for resources for infrastructural development may open up a new vista 
of international engagement and cooperation for Africa. At the same time, it demands a close 
monitoring and auditing of what Africa surrenders vis-à-vis what it obtains in order to avoid 
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the kind of unbridled regional exploitation by outsiders widely chronicled throughout the 
region’s history. 
 
Conclusion 
 The subject of our research, like many others that occupy social scientists, remains a 
moving target. What our effort here has done is to merely stop and hold that moving target in 
place and time long enough to address some important questions of now. Obviously, what 
happens to that target with time becomes a matter to be determined by both time and 
circumstances many of which may not even be in play at present. In the least then, our research 
establishes a baseline against which those future trajectories may be measured. As former 
United States President, Bill Clinton noted in our opening remark, a rendering further 
buttressed by Stephen Hays with his comments above regarding the World Bank, China is 
spending heavily in Africa and that expenditure is winning her friends among Africans. China 
is making friends among liberal, young, and educated African men and women who are 
optimistic about their nation’s outlook, that optimism being driven primarily by what they see 
as China’s generosity that also benefits them individually.   
 Meanwhile, we can at least confirm that if China went into Africa to “purchase” the 
“hearts and minds” of Africans—to undercut the U.S. and West—as some have alleged, China 
is receiving a lot of goodwill (and resources) for her money. However, if by winning hearts 
and minds we imply selling and acceptance of Chinese ideology and culture cold-war style 
that is clearly not the case. Correspondingly, if the proposition that China is overtaking the 
U.S. and the West as the dominant social, economic, and political force in Africa is anchored 
on this false premise of wholesale acceptance of Chinese over Western ideology by Africans, 
our research discredits it resoundingly. In fact, if the strident impediments uncovered by our 
research are anything to go by, one has no choice but to affirm that that proposition is utterly 
far-fetched. Perhaps this chilling nuance can now open the door for both a different kind of 
prospect and conversation about China’s involvement in Africa.  
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APPENDIX   PEW SURVEY QUESTIONS USED IN THE STUDY 
  
 
Q9 Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable 
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or very unfavorable opinion of (The United States; China)?  
Table Description: Favorable 
 
Q11 I’d like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country).  
Do you think that (The United States’ power and influence; China’s power and influence) is 
a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?  
Table Description: Threat 
 
Q25 What's the best model economy for (survey country) to try to follow - a free market 
capitalist one such as in the United States or a state capitalist one such as in China? 
Table Description: Best model 
 
Q29 Today, which ONE of the following do you think is the world’s leading economic power? 
(The United States; China) 
Table Description: Leading econ 
 
Q30 Which comes closest to your view – China will eventually replace the U.S. as the world’s 
leading superpower; China has already replaced the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower; 
or China will never replace the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower?  
Table Description: Replace U.S.  
 
Q47 In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States 
takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, 
not too much, or not at all?  and  Q59 In making international policy decisions, to what extent 
do you think China takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great 
deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?   
Table Description: Consider others 
 
Q48 Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?  It’s good that American 
ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it’s bad that American ideas and customs are 
spreading here.   And Q60 Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?  It’s 
good that Chinese ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it’s bad that Chinese ideas and 
customs are spreading here. 
Table Description: Ideas 
 
Q49 And which of these comes closer to your view?  I like American ideas about democracy, 
OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.   
Table Description: Democracy 
 
Q50 Which comes closer to describing your view?  I like American ways of doing business, 
OR I dislike American ways of doing business.  And Q61 Which comes closer to describing 
your view?  I like Chinese ways of doing business, OR I dislike Chinese ways of doing 
business.   
 
Table Description: B. model  
 
Q51 Which is closer to describing your view—I like American music, movies and television, 
22
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 [2016], Art. 5
http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol22/iss3/5
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy                 
Fall 2015 
 
OR I dislike American music, movies and television.  And Q62 Which is closer to describing 
your view—I like Chinese music, movies and television, OR I dislike Chinese music, movies 
and television.   
Table Description: Like music 
 
Q52 And which comes closer to describing your view?  I admire the United States for its 
technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire the United States for its 
technological and scientific advances.  And Q63 And which comes closer to describing your 
view?  I admire China for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire China 
for its technological and scientific advances.  
 Table Description: Admire tec  
 
Q58a Overall, would you say U.S. economic aid to (survey country) is having a mostly 
positive impact, a mostly negative impact, or no impact on the way things are going in (survey 
country)?  
Table Description: Good econ 
 
Q78 Overall, how much influence do you think the United States is having on the way things 
are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, 
not too much, or no influence at all? And Q79 How much influence do you think China is 
having on the way things are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of 
influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all?  
Table Description: Influence 
 
Q78b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q78 (Q78=1,2) Is this a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad? And  Q79b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q79 (Q79=1,2) 
Is this a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?  
Table Description: Inf. good 
 
Q80 And thinking specifically about our country’s economy, how much influence do you 
think the United States is having on economic conditions in (survey country)—a great deal of 
influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all? And Q81 And how much 
influence do you think China is having on economic conditions in (survey country)—a great 
deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all? 
Table Description: Inf. econ 
 
Q80b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q80 (Q80=1,2) Right now, is the United States 
having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (survey country)? And Q81b 
ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q81 (Q81=1,2)  Right now, is China having a positive 
or negative impact on economic conditions in (survey country)?  
Table Description: Positive 
 
Q82 Is it more important for (survey country) to have strong ties with China or with the United 
States? 
Table Description: Country ties 
 
Q119 Overall, do you think of China as more of a partner of (survey country), more of an 
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enemy of (survey country), or neither?  And Q120 Overall, do you think of the U.S. as more 
of a partner of (survey country), more of an enemy of (survey country), or neither?   
Table Description: Partner 
 
Q127 Do you think the government of (The United States; China) respects the personal 
freedoms of its people, or don’t you think so?  
Table Description: Respect
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